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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, based onl lC. A. §78 A-4- 103(2)(j), in that 
this case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals by thb Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Mr. Magistro' s 
claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process where the criminal action against Mr. 
Magistro was not terminated in his favor, but instead, MrL Magistro entered into a plea 
bargain agreement whereby he pled guilty to the crime off lewdness in exchange for an 
agreement by the prosecutor to drop the charge of sexual battery. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Mr. 
Magistro's claim of abuse of process, where there was no allegation or evidence of any 
misuse of the legal process or wrongful ulterior motive in repprting Mr. Magistro's unlawful 
sexual conduct to the police. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Mr. Magistro's 
claims of defamation where the statements by Jordan Day to the police and to the criminal 
court concerning Mr. Magistro's conduct were true, or substantially true, where the 
statements were privileged and where Mr. Magistro cannot 3how any damages as a result of 
such statements. 
4. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Mr. Magistro's 
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress where Mr. Magistro admitted to 
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essentially all of the conduct which Jordan Day reported to the police, and in fact pled guilty 
and was sentenced for that conduct. 
5. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary j udgment against Mr. Magistro' s 
claims for punitive damages where there was no basis for Mr. Magistro 's claims for 
compensatory or general damages, and where there was no conduct on the part of Jordan Day 
which could be considered "willful and malicious," or "conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from a summary judgment, the Utah Court of Appeals will review for 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's decision. Alf v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
The above issues were presented to the trial court, in that they were raised in the 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 34-35). 
RELEVANT STATUTE 
The Utah statute pertaining to punitive damages is U.C.A. §78B-8-201(l), which 
provides as follows: 
(l)(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, 
and a disregard of, the rights of others.. . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CA&E 
A. Nature of the Case 
This lawsuit arises from an unlawful sexual encoutiter by the Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Filippo Magistro, against the Defendant/Appellee, Jordan Day, at the Orem Fitness Center, 
a public family swimming pool and gymnasium in Orem, Utah. Jordan Day reported the 
incident to the police and criminal charges were brought against Mr. Magistro for the 
incident. Mr. Magistro was initially charged with forcible sexual abuse, but the charges were 
later changed to sexual battery (a class A misdemeanor) and lewdness (a class B 
misdemeanor). Mr. Magistro entered into a plea bargain agreement with the prosecutor 
whereby Mr. Magistro pled guilty to lewdness and the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the 
charge of sexual battery. Mr. Magistro then sued Jordan Day, alleging malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress on 
the part of Jordan Day, claiming that he thought Jordan Day consented to his sexual 
advances. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court ftelow 
During the deposition of Filippo Magistro, Mr. Magilstro admitted to everything that 
Jordan Day had told the police. Mr. Magistro admitted that while he was in the sauna at the 
Orem Fitness Center with Jordan, he took Jordan Day's hand and put it on his penis. He 
further admitted that after he was charged with lewdness and sexual battery, he entered into 
a plea bargain agreement whereby he pled guilty to lewdness and the prosecutor agreed to 
drop the charge of sexual battery. Based on these and other admissions by Mr. Magistro in 
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his deposition, Jordan Day filed a motion for summary judgment. After briefing by the 
parties, the trial court heard oral arguments on Jordan Day's motion for summary judgment 
on January 11, 2010, at which time the Court granted Jordan Day's motion for summary 
judgment. The summary judgment was signed and entered by the Court on February 2,2010. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
All of the critical facts of this case are uncontroverted. In fact, in his memorandum 
in opposition to Jordan Day's motion for summary judgment., Mr. Magistro admitted (R. 227) 
that all of the following facts are uncontroverted: 
1. The Plaintiff, Filippo Magistro, is a 63 year-old man, who is married and has 
six adult children. (R.76; 64.) 
2- At the time of the incident in question, on December 9, 2008, the Defendant, 
Jordan Day, was approximately 21 years-old and had just returned from a mission for the 
LDS Church. (R. 76; 62; 63.) 
3. On December 9,2008, in the sauna at the Orem Fitness Center in Orem, Utah, 
Mr. Magistro took the hand of Jordan Day and put Jordan's hand onto Mr. Magistro's penis. 
(R. 76; 61-62; 59; 51; 50.) Mr. Magistro was sexually aroused at the time. (R. 76; 50.) 
4. Jordan Day reported the incident to the Orem City Police Department and Mr. 
Magistro was arrested by an Orem City police officer the same day. (R. 76; 57-60.) Mr. 
Magistro spent one night at the Utah County Jail and then bailed out. (R. 76; 57.) 
5. Mr. Magistro first lied to the police officer and said there was no sexual 
encounter, but later admitted to the sexual encounter. (R.76; 60.) Mr. Magistro again lied to 
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the officer by telling the officer this experience had never happened to him before when, in 
fact, Mr. Magistro had a previous sexual encounter with another man at the sauna at the 
Orem Fitness Center about six months previously. (R. 76; 58.) Mr. Magistro then told the 
officer he was not completely innocent, but he was not completely guilty. (R. 76; 58.) 
6. Mr. Magistro originally was charged with two counts of forcible sexual abuse. 
(R. 76; 57; R. 48-49.) The charges were later amended to one count of sexual battery (a class 
A misdemeanor) and one count of lewdness (a class B misdemeanor). (R. 75; 45-47.) 
7. Mr. Magistro retained an attorney to represent jiim in the criminal case. (R. 75; 
57.) With the assistance and advice of his attorney, Mr. Magistro entered into a plea bargain 
agreement on April 29, 2009, by which the prosecutor agreed to drop the count of sexual 
battery in exchange for Mr. Magistro's guilty plea to lewdness. (R. 75; 56-57; 38-44.) 
8. The court accepted Mr. Magistro's guilty plea and sentenced Mr. Magistro to 
a six month jail term, suspended; fined Mr. Magistro $ 1,000.00, with $800.00 suspended; and 
placed Mr. Magistro on probation for 12 months, to be supervised by the court. (R. 75; 56; 
36-37.) 
9. After his arrest, Mr. Magistro told his wife and children that he had two sexual 
encounters with men he did not know at the Orem Fitness Center. (R. 75; 54.) He first 
testified that he was trying to keep both sexual encounters secret, but then changed his 
testimony and said that, most likely, he would have told his family about the sexual 
encounters because he was starting to have a guilty feeling. (R. 75; 54.) Mr. Magistro 
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claimed that he thought the sexual encounter against Jordan Day was consensual and that he 
did not force the encounter. (R. 75; 54.) 
In addition to the foregoing facts, all of which Mr. Magistro admitted were 
uncontroverted, Mr. Magistro testified that his family has not shunned him since his arrest. 
(R. 53.) In fact, his wife and children testified on his behalf at the sentencing in his criminal 
case. (R. 56.) Mr. Magistro admitted that both his family and his church members would be 
very offended by his sexual encounters with other men at the Orem Fitness Center regardless 
of his claim that the encounters were consensual. (R. 52, 55.) 
The "Statement of the Case" and the "Statement of Facts" in Mr. Magistro's brief are 
filled with unsupported references to a hearsay police report which was presented to the court 
without foundation. (R. 111-130.) Jordan Day objected to this police report on the grounds 
of lack of foundation and hearsay (R. 241.), but even if the police report is considered by the 
court, there is nothing in the report which changes the central facts of the case, all of which 
were admitted by Mr. Magistro. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution has the burden of proving 
all of the following: (1) that the defendant initiated or procured the initiation of criminal 
proceedings against an innocent plaintiff; (2) that the defendant did not have probable cause 
to initiate the prosecution; (3) that the defendant initiated the proceedings primarily for a 
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice; and (4) that the proceedings 
terminated in favor of the plaintiff. While Mr. Magistro has failed to establish evidence of 
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any of these four elements, the absolutely critical element i$ that the criminal proceedings 
against Mr. Magistro must have been terminated in his favor.j In this case, Mr. Magistro was 
charged with sexual battery (a class A misdemeanor) and lewdness (a class B misdemeanor). 
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Mr. Magistro pled guilty to the crime of lewdness in 
exchange for an agreement by the prosecutor to drop the change of sexual battery. Based on 
his guilty plea, Mr. Magistro was convicted and sentenced. The criminal proceedings against 
Mr. Magistro were not terminated in his favor and he has not met the necessary elements for 
a claim of malicious prosecution. 
IL Mr. Magistro's complaint fails to state a cause of action for abuse of process, 
as it alleges only that Jordan lied to the police and committed perjury at the preliminary 
hearing in stating that the sexual encounter by Mr. Magistro against Jordan was not 
consensual. There is no allegation of an ulterior purpose or misuse of the process for a 
wrongful and unlawful object. Even if the complaint property alleged a cause of action for 
abuse of process, which it does not, there is no evidenc0 to support such a claim. All 
significant facts reported by Jordan to the police are admittedly true and there is no basis for 
any claim of wrongful and unlawful ulterior motive. 
III. In order to establish a claim for defamation, it ^ s the plaintiff s burden to prove 
all of the following: (1) that the defendant published statem0nts concerning the plaintiff; (2) 
that the statements were false, defamatory and not subject to any privilege; (3) that the 
statements were published with the requisite degree of fai^ lt; and (4) that their publication 
resulted in damage. Mr. Magistro cannot establish an^ of these elements. First, all 
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statements by Jordan Day to the police and in court were true or substantially true. Second, 
all statements by Jordan Day to the police and to the court were privileged, as they were 
made in connection with a judicial proceeding against Mr. Magistro and were not 
"excessively published." Third, Mr. Magistro cannot show any damages. While the reaction 
of his family and church members to his unlawful sexual encounter against Jordan Day at the 
Orem Fitness Center was undoubtedly unpleasant for Mr. Ma gistro, that reaction was not due 
to any alleged false or defamatory statements by Jordan Day, but was due to Mr. Magistro's 
unlawful sexual contact with another man at the Orem Fitness Center, which Mr. Magistro 
admits. 
IV. Under Utah law, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress requires proof of all of the following: (1) that the defendant intentionally engaged 
in conduct toward the plaintiff with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress; (2) that any 
reasonable person would have known that such emotional distress would result; and (3) that 
the defendant's actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable 
in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. 
In the present case, there clearly is no basis for Mr. Magistro's claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Mr. Magistro has essentially admitted to all of the conduct 
which Jordan Day reported to the police, and in fact pled guilty and was sentenced for that 
conduct. Clearly, there is no evidence of any conduct on the part of Jordan Day which was 
so outrageous and intolerable as to offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. 
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V, Mr. Magistro's complaint also seeks punitive damages against Jordan Day. 
Under Utah law, punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages 
are awarded. Since there is no basis for Mr. Magistro's claims for compensatory or general 
damages, there is no basis for his claims of punitive damages. Even if there were any basis 
for his claims for compensatory or general damages, which there is not, there still would be 
no basis for Mr. Magistro's claims for punitive damages, as it cannot be "established by clear 
and convincing evidence that the acts or admissions of the tqrtfeasor are the result of willful 
or malicious and intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward and a disregard, the rights of cithers." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. MAGISTRO HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION WHERE THE CRIMINAL 
ACTION WAS NOT TERMINATED IN I^IS FAVOR 
The plaintiff, in an action for malicious prosecution, |has the burden of proving all of 
the following: (1) that the defendant initiated or procured the initiation of criminal 
proceedings against an innocent plaintiff; (2) that the defen4ant did not have probable cause 
to initiate the prosecution; (3) that the defendant initiated the proceedings primarily for a 
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice; and (4) that the proceedings 
terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co,, 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 
1991); Calliouxv. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utafy App. 1987); Arnica Mutual Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §653 
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(1977). The failure to establish any one of these four elements is fatal to the cause of action. 
Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Shettler, supra. 
While Mr. Magistro has failed to establish evidence of any of these four elements, the 
absolutely critical element is that the criminal proceedings against Mr. Magistro must have 
been terminated in favor of Mr. Magistro. The criminal proceedings clearly were not 
terminated in favor of Mr. Magistro. 
In Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, 199 P.3d 971, the court approved 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §660 (1977), which describes what is necessary for a 
termination of the criminal proceedings in favor of the plaintiff, in order to meet the 
requirements for a cause of action for malicious prosecution. This section states: 
Section 660. Indecisive Termination of Proceedings. 
A termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the accused 
other than by acquittal is not a sufficient termination to meet the 
requirements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution if 
(a) the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution 
abandoned pursuant to an agreement of 
compromise with the accused; or 
(b) the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution 
abandoned because of misconduct on the part of 
the accused or in his behalf for the purpose of 
preventing proper trial; or 
(c) the charge is withdrawn or the proceeding 
abandoned out of mercy requested or accepted by 
the accused; or 
(d) new proceedings for the same offense have been 
properly instituted and have not been terminated 
in favor of the accused. 
(Emphasis added). 
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In the present case, the criminal charges against iVlr. Magistro clearly were not 
terminated in his favor. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Mr. Magistro pled guilty to 
the crime of lewdness in exchange for an agreement by the prosecutor to drop the charge of 
sexual battery. Pursuant to Mr. Magistro's guilty plea, Mr. Magistro was convicted of the 
crime of lewdness and sentenced to a six month suspended jail term, a fine of $1,000.00 
($800.00 of which was suspended), and ordered to complete twelve months of court 
supervised probation. Since the charge of sexual battery w^s withdrawn by the prosecutor 
"pursuant to an agreement of compromise with the accuse^," and since Mr. Magistro still 
pled guilty to the crime of lewdness, of which he was convijcted, the criminal proceedings 
against Mr. Magistro were not terminated in his favor and I Mr. Magistro has not met the 
elements required for a cause of action for malicious prosecution. 
Since Mr. Magistro did not establish the necessary elements of a claim for malicious 
prosecution, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim. 
POINT II 
MR. MAGISTRO'S COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A 
CLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS AND THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A CLAIM, 
The fourth cause of action of Mr. Magistro's complaiht against Jordan Day purported 
to allege a cause of action for abuse of process. (R. 3.) Th0 complaint alleged that Jordan 
Day had an ulterior motive when he made false allegations against Mr. Magistro, to cover 
up his involvement in the sexual encounter and protect his refutation. The complaint alleged 
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that Jordan lied to the police officer and committed perjury. This does not state a cause of 
action for abuse of process under Utah law. 
In Puttuckv. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362,199 P.3d 971, the court stated that in order 
to establish a claim for abuse of process, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an ulterior 
purpose; and (2) "an act in the use of process not proper in the regular prosecution of the 
proceedings." (Citing Anderson Dev. Co, v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 65, 116 P.3d 323.) The 
court stated that the gist of the tort of abuse of process is nol commencing an action without 
justification, but "misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than 
that which it was designed to accomplish." A claim for abuse of process must describe not 
just misuse of process, but misuse "for some wrongful and unlawful object, or ulterior 
purpose." (Id., Tf 13.) The court stated that the ulterior puipose usually involves coercing 
someone to do something which he would not otherwise be legally obligated to do. (Id. Tf 14.) 
In Puttock, just as in the present case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were 
guilty of abuse of process by making false claims and giving false testimony in another 
lawsuit. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants used the civil process to accomplish a 
purpose for which it was not designed, in that the civil process system was not designed to 
prosecute false claims supported by perjured testimony. The Utah Court of Appeals held that 
these allegations did not constitute a claim for abuse of process under Utah law and affirmed 
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claims for abuse of process. 
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Just as in the Puttock case, the "abuse of process" alleged by Mr. Magistro is nothing 
more than allegations that Jordan Day gave a false statement to the police officer and false 
testimony at trial. Such claims cannot support a claim for abuse of process. 
Even if Mr. Magistro had properly stated a claim for ablise of process under Utah law, 
the evidence clearly does not support such a claim. The unc0ntroverted facts, all of which 
have been specifically admitted by Mr. Magistro, establish th$t all of the critical facts which 
Jordan Day reported to the police and testified to at trial were true, were admitted by Mr. 
Magistro, and were the basis for Mr. Magistro's guilty pleaand criminal conviction. Mr. 
Magistro's claim that Jordan had an ulterior motive in reporting Mr. Magistro's sexual 
misconduct to the police also makes no sense. Mr. Magistro claims that Jordan reported the 
incident to the police to hide from his girlfriend the fact that he had a sexual encounter with 
another man. If he wanted to hide the encounter from his girlfriend, he would have said 
nothing. He certainly would not have reported it to the police. There is no basis for Mr. 
Magistro's claims of abuse of process. 
POINT III 
MR. MAGISTRO HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
DEFAMATION, AS THE STATEMENT^ BY JORDAN 
DAY TO THE POLICE AND TO THE CRIMINAL 
COURT WERE TRUE, OR SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE, 
THE STATEMENTS WERE PRIVILEGED, AND MR. 
MAGISTRO CANNOT SHOW ANY DAMAGES AS A 
RESULT OF SUCH STATEMENTS. 
In order to establish a claim for defamation, it is the plaintiffs burden to prove all of 
the following: (1) that the defendant published statements Concerning the plaintiff; (2) that 
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the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege; (3) that the statements 
were published with the requisite degree of fault; and (4) that their publication resulted in 
damage. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994); Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 
UT 81, 130 P.3d 325; Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, 212 P.3d 535. Mr. Magistro cannot 
establish any of these elements. 
A. Jordan Day's Statements Were True. 
Under Utah law, there is no cause of action for defamation if the statements of which 
the plaintiff complains were true. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325. The 
statements do not have to be absolutely or completely true, but it is sufficient if the 
statements are "substantially true." The statements "may be infected with inaccuracy, 
innuendo, and outright falsity and still not be actionable so long as their 'gist' or 'sting5 rings 
true." (Id.) 
In this case, Jordan told the Orem Police Department that Mr. Magistro grabbed 
Jordan's hand and put it on Mr. Magistro's penis. Mr. Magistro has admitted that all of this 
was true and that Mr. Magistro did it for his own sexual gratification. Mr. Magistro further 
pled guilty to lewdness, based on his admitted conduct. Mr. Magistro further admitted that 
on at least one prior occasion he had a similar sexual encounter with another man in the 
sauna at the Orem Fitness Center. 
Even though Mr. Magistro admits that Mr. Magistro took Jordan's hand and put it on 
Mr. Magistro's penis, Mr. Magistro claims that Jordan did not tell the police the truth 
because Jordan told the police that Mr. Magistro had hugged him outside the sauna, that Mr. 
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Magistro had followed Jordan around the locker room and that Mr. Magistro had cornered 
Jordan in the sauna, which Mr. Magistro claims was not tru^. These facts have nothing to 
do with the conduct of which Jordan complained to the police; nor the conduct for which Mr. 
Magistro was charged with crimes. 
Mr. Magistro admits that all of the material statements by Jordan Day to the police and 
all of Jordan Day's statements at the preliminary hearing ih Mr. Magistro's criminal case 
were substantially true. Mr. Magistro admits that while h^ was in the sauna at the Orem 
Fitness Center, Mr. Magistro took Jordan's hand and put it on Mr. Magistro's penis. He 
admits that in doing so he committed a crime. The mo$t that can be taken from Mr. 
Magistro's testimony is that Mr. Magistro thought he had [Jordan's consent to the sexual 
encounter, when he in fact did not. 
Regardless of Mr. Magistro's testimony about whether he did or did not follow Jordan 
around the locker room and whether he did or did not comer Jordan in the sauna, the 
undisputed fact is that everything Jordan Day told the police about the sexual encounter with 
Mr. Magistro was true or substantially true, and cannot support a claim for defamation. 
B. Jordan Day's Statements Were Privileged. 
Under Utah law, a witness' statements in connectioh with a judicial proceeding are 
absolutely privileged against suits alleging defamation. Krpuse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, 20 
P.3d 895; Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,164 P.3d 366. This absolute privilege has even been 
extended by the Utah Supreme Court to unsworn testimony by witnesses before legislative 
committees. Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, 40 P.3d 1128. In Krouse v. Bower, supra., the 
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Utah Supreme Court held that the absolute privilege for "judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants, 
and counsel involved in a judicial proceeding" extends to letters by counsel to interested 
parties prior to the filing of a lawsuit, provided that the statements are not "excessively 
published." See also Pratt v. Nelson, supra.1 
Based on the Utah cases cited above, there is no question that all statements by Jordan 
Day at the preliminary hearing in the criminal action against Mr. Magistro were absolutely 
privileged. The only remaining question is whether Jordan Day's statements to the police 
officer which led to criminal charges against Mr. Magistro were absolutely privileged or 
subject to a qualified privilege. This question has not specifically been answered by the Utah 
appellate courts. 
Numerous cases from other jurisdictions have held that statements by an individual 
to a police officer regarding possible crimes committed by another are absolutely privileged 
against any tort claims except a cause of action for malicious prosecution. 
InHagbergv. California Federal Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, at 32 Cal. 4th 350 (2004), 
the plaintiff, a Hispanic woman, attempted to cash a check at the defendant bank. Employees 
1
 Mr. Magistro's brief claims that in addition to telling the police officer about Mr. 
Magistro's actions, Jordan told his mother, his girlfriend and his girlfriend's father about 
the incident. Mr. Magistro cites Jordan's testimony at Mr. Magistro's preliminary 
hearing, in which he states that he just told his mother something bad had happened until 
they were at the police department (R. 147.); that he told his girlfriend only that 
something bad happened (R. 146.); and that he did not tell his girlfriend's father any 
specific details, but just asked what he should do (R. 145-146.). He also cites the hearsay 
police report, in which the officer states that Jordan's girlfriend said Jordan told her that a 
male sexually assaulted him in the locker room. There clearly is no evidence of any 
excessive publication of privileged statements. 
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of the bank suspected the check was counterfeit and called the police to investigate. The 
police allegedly detained the plaintiff, spread her legs, patted her down and handcuffed her 
in the presence of other individuals. The police then determined that the allegation that the 
check was counterfeit was unfounded and released the plaintliff The plaintiff then sued the 
bank, alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, slander, invasion of privacy, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligence and other torts. The plaintiff claimed that the 
bank acted with malice in reporting the incident to the police. 
The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that all of the plaintiffs claims 
were subject to an absolute privilege under California law. The California Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that an absolute privilege under California law barred all tort causes of 
action for alleged false statements to a police officer except a claim for malicious 
prosecution. The court cited § 47(b) of the California Civil Code, which provided that a 
privilege barred a civil action for communications made "[i]h any (1) legislative proceeding, 
(2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the 
initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to 
[statutes governing writs of mandate]." The court reasoned that the absolute privilege of 
statements made by an individual to the police department regarding suspected criminal 
activity on the part of the plaintiff was essential to allow citizens "free and open access to 
governmental agencies for the reporting of suspected illegal activity." 
InLedvina v. Cerasani, 213 Arizona 569, 146 P.3d ^0 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 2006), the 
defendant, Cerasani, reported to the police that his neighbor Ledvina, had slashed the tires 
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on his recreational vehicle. Ledvina was charged with criminal damage. Ledvina later sued 
Cerasani for defamation, claiming that Cerasani's report to the police was made "in reckless 
disregard of the truth" and "uttered maliciously." The Arizona Court of Appeals held that 
Cerasani's report to the police was absolutely privileged, and affirmed summary judgment 
in favor of Cerasani. The court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts §587, which states: 
A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor . . . is 
absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning 
another in communications preliminary to the proposed judicial 
proceeding, or in the institution of ox during the course or as part 
of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the matter 
has some relation to the proceeding. 
(Emphasis provided by the court.) 
The court further cited Restatement (Second) of Torts §558, for the following: 
A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter 
concerning another in communications preliminary to a 
proposed judicial proceeding or as part of a judicial proceeding 
in which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the 
proceeding. 
The court further cited Comment (E) to Restatement (Second) of Torts §598, for the 
following: 
Formal or informal complaints to a prosecuting attorney or other 
law enforcement officer concerning violations of the criminal 
law are absolutely privileged under the rule stated in Section 
587. 
The Arizona court also cited W. Page Keeton, et aL Prosser andKeeton on the Law 
of Torts §114, at 819-20 (5th ed. 1984), for the following: 
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"complaint to a prosecuting attorney or a magistrate is to be 
regarded as an initial step in a judicial proceeding." 
The court cited McGranahan v. Dakar, 119 N.H. 758,408 Aj2d 121,128-129 (1979), for the 
following: 
[W]e adopt the rule that treats both form(al and informal 
complaints and statements to a prosecuting authority as part of 
the initial steps in a judicial proceeding, and ^s such entitled to 
absolute immunity from an action for defamation. W. Prosser, 
Torts si 14 at 781 (4th ed. 1971). The same absolute immunity 
or privilege applies to statements made to the city or county 
attorney or those investigating a suspected crime. 
Just as in the California Supreme Court decision in Hagberg, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals reasoned that an absolute privilege from civil litigation was necessary to promote 
free and unhindered communications to law enforcement agencies. Also as in Hagberg, the 
Arizona court held that while the plaintiff could not pursue a claim for defamation, the 
plaintiff still could pursue a claim for malicious prosecution, }f the elements of that tort were 
met. 
Other cases which have held that reports to a police officer are subject to an absolute 
privilege include Starnes v. International Harvester Co,, 184 111. App. 3d 199, 539 N.E. 2d 
1372 (1989); Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 572 N.E|. 2d 7 (1991); McGranahan v. 
Dakar, 119 N.H. 758,408 A 2d 121 (1979); General Electric Co, v, Sargent, 916 F.2d 1119 
(6th Cir. 1990); Vorg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1956); £utts v, American United Life 
Insurance Co,, 505 So. 2d 1211 (Ala. 1987); Hall v. Pizza Uut, 153 Mich. App. 609, 396 
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N.W. 2d 809 (1986); White v. Vasnett, 700 P.2d 666 (Okla. Civ. App. 1985) and Hott v. 
Yarbrough, 112 Tex. 179, 245 S.W. 676 (Comm'n App. 1922). 
Even in those cases which have not recognized an absolute privilege for statements 
made by an individual to a police officer concerning crimes committed by another, the courts 
have consistently held that there is at least a qualified privilege, and to overcome that 
privilege the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally or recklessly made false 
statements to the police, and that the defendant's primary motive was the intent to injure the 
plaintiff. In Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1992), the court held that statements 
to the police concerning crimes committed by another are subject to a qualified privilege, and 
to overcome that privilege the plaintiff must prove that the statements made by the defendant 
to the police were intentionally false and uttered with "common law express malice - i.e., that 
the defendant's primary motive in making the statements was the intent to injure the 
reputation of the plaintiff." In Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E. 2d 756 (Indiana 2009), the court 
held that the qualified privilege requires proof that the defendant made false statements to 
the police, knowing them to be false. 
In Pope v. Motel 6, 114 P.3d 277 (Nev. 2005), the court held that statements to the 
police are subject to a qualified privilege, and to overcome that privilege, the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant made a false statement to the police "with actual malice." The 
plaintiff must prove that the false statement by the defendant was made "with knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for its veracity." 
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In the present case, all statements by Jordan Day to the police should be absolutely 
privileged, pursuant to the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Hagberg, supra, the 
reasoning of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Ledvina, supra ind the other cases cited above. 
Even if the court applies a qualified privilege, however, unc|er the uncontroverted facts of 
this case, all statements by Jordan to the police are privileged. 
The only "evidence" of Jordan Day's statement to thfe Orem City Police officer is a 
hearsay police report which was submitted without foundation with Mr. Magistro's 
memorandum in opposition to Jordan Day's motion for summary judgment. Jordan objected 
to the police report and it should not be considered by the court, but even if the report is 
considered, all of the significant statements by Jordan Day to the police officer were true and 
Mr. Magistro has admitted those facts. Mr. Magistro has admitted that while he was in the 
sauna at the Orem Fitness Center he took Jordan's hand aftd put it on his penis. He has 
admitted that he did so for sexual gratification. His only defense is that he thought Jordan 
consented to his actions, even though he admitted that Jordan never told him he consented. 
In reporting the incident to the police, Jordan told the police exactly what had happened. He 
told them that Mr. Magistro was in the sauna, that he took Jordan's hand and that he put it 
on his penis. 
Mr. Magistro's brief argues that Jordan "intentionally and maliciously" lied to the 
police, and yet he admits that all of the essential statements on which the criminal charges 
against Mr. Magistro were based were true. In fact, Mr. Magistro even entered into a plea 
bargain and pled guilty to the sexual encounter against Jordan Day. 
-21-
Mr. Magistro's brief repeatedly states that Jordan Day reported to the police that Mr. 
Magistro committed second degree felony forcible sexual abuse on Jordan. The police report 
shows that, in fact, Jordan told the police exactly what had happened in the sauna. The 
decision to charge Mr. Magistro with forcible sexual abuse, and later to reduce the charge 
to sexual battery and lewdness was made solely by the prosecutor and was not within 
Jordan's control. 
In support of his claim that his sexual encounter against Jordan Day was consensual, 
Mr. Magistro makes the very strange claim that Jordan voluntarily went to the police and lied 
about the encounter in order to hide from Jordan's girlfriend the fact that he had had a sexual 
encounter with Mr. Magistro. If Jordan had intended to hide the sexual encounter he 
obviously would have said nothing, and not reported it to the police. 
In spite of all of the unsupported claims and allegations by Mr. Magistro, the 
uncontroverted evidence shows that all of Jordan Day's statements to the police were true 
or substantially true. The statements clearly were not intentionally false, they were not made 
with malice toward Mr. Magistro and they were not made with reckless disregard of the truth. 
Therefore, regardless of which standard is applied by the court, Jordan's statements to the 
police were privileged and cannot support a claim of defamation. 
C. Mr. Magisto Cannot Show Any Damages. 
In order to pursue a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must prove damages. Jensen v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,130 P.3d 325. The damages alleged by Mr. Magistro, problems with 
the relationship with his wife and children and being shunned by members of his church, do 
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not relate to any alleged false statements by Jordan Day, but rtelate solely to the fact that Mr. 
Magistro was caught when he was attempting a sexual encounter with another man at the 
Orem Fitness Center. He admits that this was the second tirrie this had occurred and that he 
likely would have told his family about the sexual encounters because he was starting to have 
a guilty feeling. He admits that neither his family nor his church members believed that it 
was a forcible sexual contact, but he further admits that his actions were contrary to the 
morals of his family and his church and that his family and church members were offended 
by his sexual contact with men at the Orem Fitness Center lacker room. While the reaction 
of his family and church members to Mr. Magistro's conduit was undoubtedly unpleasant 
for Mr. Magistro, that reaction was not due to any alleged falbe or defamatory statements by 
Jordan Day, but was due to Mr. Magistro's unlawful sexual contact with other men at the 
Orem Fitness Center locker room, which Mr. Magistro admits. 
Since Mr. Magistro cannot prove damages, his claim for defamation must fail. 
POINT IV 
MR MAGISTRO HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS. 
Under Utah law, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
requires proof of all of the following: (1) that the defendant intentionally engaged in 
conduct toward the plaintiff with the purpose of inflicting tpmotional distress; (2) that any 
reasonable person would have known that such emotional ditstress would result; and (3) that 
the defendant's actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable 
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in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Oman 
v. Davis School District, UT 70, 194 P.3d 956. To be considered outrageous, the conduct 
must evoke outrage or revulsion. It must be more than unreasonable, unkind or unfair. 
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, 21 P.3d 198. The 
conduct must be "so extreme in degree as to go beyond any possible bounds of decency, so 
as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." 
"It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct 
may reasonably regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery or whether it 
is necessarily so. Only when reasonable men may differ is it for the jury to decide whether 
the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability." Gygi v. 
Storch, 503 P.2d 449 (Utah 1972). 
In the present case, there clearly is no basis for Mr. Magistro's claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Mr. Magistro has essentially admitted all of the conduct 
which Jordan Day reported to the police, and in fact pled guilty and was sentenced for that 
conduct. Clearly, there is no evidence of any conduct on the part of Jordan Day which was 
so outrageous and intolerable as to permit a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR MR. MAGISTRO'S CLAIMS 
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
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Mr. Magistro's complaint also seeks punitive damages against Jordan Day. Since 
there is no basis for Mr. Magistro's claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress, there can be no basis for Mr, 
Magistro's claims for punitive damages. U.C.A. §78B-8-201(l)(a) states, "except as 
otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or 
general damages are awarded. . . ." Since Mr. Magistro is thot entitled to compensatory or 
general damages, he is not entitled to punitive damages. 
Even if there were any basis for Mr. Magistro's claims for compensatory or general 
damages, which there is not, there still would be no basi$ for Mr. Magistro's claims of 
punitive damages. In order to recover punitive damages it must be "established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the claims or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." U.C.A. §78B-8-201. 
There is absolutely no evidence of any conduct by Jordan Day which was willful and 
malicious, intentionally fraudulent, or which manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
As demonstrated above, Mr. Magistro has not only admitted to the unlawful sexual 
contact which Jordan Day reported to the police department, fcut Mr. Magistro has pled guilty 
to lewdness as a result of that conduct and has been sentenced for his crime. Since Mr. 
Magistro admittedly was guilty of the conduct reported by Jordan Day to the police 
department, Jordan's conduct cannot be considered "willful ^nd malicious" or "conduct that 
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manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of 
others. Therefore, Mr. Magistro has no cause of action for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Mr. Magistro's claims for 
malicious prosecution because the criminal proceedings against Mr. Magistro were not 
terminated in favor of Mr. Magistro, and because Mr. Magistro did not meet any of the other 
elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment against Mr. Magistro's claims of abuse of process because there was no 
allegation or evidence of misuse of the legal process for an improper purpose or of a 
wrongful or ulterior motive in reporting Mr. Magistro's unlawful conduct to the police. The 
trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Mr. Magistro's claims for defamation 
because Jordan's statements to the police and to proseculors concerning Mr. Magistro's 
conduct were true, or substantially true; because Jordan's statements to the police were 
absolutely privileged; and because there is no evidence of any damages. The trial court 
correctly granted summary judgment on Mr. Magistro's claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress because Jordan's actions were not "outrageous and intolerable in that they 
offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality" and they were not 
"so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, so as to be regarded 
as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." The trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment as to Mr. Magistro's claims for punitive damages because Mr. Magistro 
is not entitled to compensatory or general damages and because any conduct by Jordan Day 
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was not "willful and malicious" or "conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.1' 
The summary judgment entered by the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this/2? day of J L ^ g ^ ^ , 2010. 
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